Our contracts · three, for three different reasons
A is the working subject, B is the control left to decay, C is the backup proof. All three were built from one Wasm, so one code entry binds them all — and touching it touches both proofs, which is why a write guard refused it by key while the two decay proofs were running.
Health graded by core from the snapshot committed with this build: as of ledger 5,271,773. Not current — the overview reads the chain live.
The working subject. Bump it, break it, redeploy it freely — it is what every scan, screenshot and live proof is verified against.
Extended by hand on 9 September past the sprint, then twice more — see the extension history. Its code entry still binds it: 12 April 2027 at ledger 8,297,162, shared with B and C.
The natural-decay control. Calibrated once on 5 September with a disclosed extend, then left alone. It crosses the alert threshold on 20 September and expires on the 21st — be present for the second date, that is the unrepeatable event.
Already archived. Restore it with RestoreFootprintOp — extendTTL cannot reach it.
Alert threshold 20 September 2026 · expired 21 September 2026 at ledger 4,793,687. It was left alone on purpose, and that is the proof.
The backup proof, five days behind B: threshold crossing 25 September, expiry the 26th. The only second shot if B is missed.
Already archived. Restore it with RestoreFootprintOp — extendTTL cannot reach it.
Alert threshold 25 September 2026 · expired 26 September 2026 at ledger 4,880,097. That expiry was the unrepeatable event.
Key AAAAB8flXwrYnvsGALwVBIsVUJn6TZfO4WRm+hJEs9y86Yv7, from Wasm hash c7e55f0a…98bfb. Ends at ledger 8,297,162, ~12 April 2027 — read from the scan captured 19 October 2026, not typed into this page. A scan of one contract reports it with one consumer, because the chain does not index reverse dependencies — scan all three together to see the real number.