Engine

Guards

The repository cron only scans and decides. A separate local operator path may sign and submit with explicit live opt-in; these guards constrain that path and record refusals.

What keeps a contract out of reach

A contract the engine does not watch is a contract it never selects. That is the whole of it today, and it is worth saying plainly rather than implying a second layer that no longer exists.

There was a second one. A write guard held guinea-pigs B, C and their shared code entry by key and refused to write to them regardless of configuration, because they were natural-decay subjects whose ageing could not be recovered once an extension reset it. B expired on 21 September, C on 26 September, and the shared code entry was extended on 14 October — every subject it held is spent, so the guard was retired rather than left holding an empty list. A guard that cannot fire and a guard that fires wrongly are the same defect seen from two sides.

The distinction it taught is the part worth keeping: the watched list is documentation, a guard is a mechanism. A pre-flight document once claimed that leaving a subject out of the watched list was enough, because “the engine still scans and decides, the guard still refuses”. It does not: the engine iterates the watched contracts, so an unwatched subject is never selected and the guard was never consulted. Measured against the real config, that produced two decisions and no refusal anywhere.

A refusal is recorded, not thrown

When a run declines a contract it records the reason with the subject named and continues to the next one. Two reasons, and both still hold for every check below:

  • One declined subject must not abort a run, or a refusal on one contract would silence the engine for every other contract in the same pass.
  • The refusal is the evidence. A refusal leaves no transaction, no hash and no explorer trace, so the only proof it happened is the line in the run record.

Before anything is signed

CheckWhat it stops
modeOmitted means dry-run. Live is explicit, never inferred.
network passphraseCompared, not trusted. This is the mainnet guard.
payer resolutionChecked when the config is read. No fallback payer exists.
selected key / targetOnly the entries named are touched; storage is never enumerated.
fee capA configured ceiling in stroops, applied per bump.
signed-envelope validationThe envelope is checked against what was planned before it goes out.
post-state checkThe result is verified rather than assumed from a successful submission.

These are the Stage 1 controls described in docs/POLICY-SIGNER.md. What is not implemented is described there too, and on Security and keys.

Overlapping runs

The local live path keeps an attempt journal and fails closed when a prior attempt is uncertain. An operator must retain that journal and reconcile its transaction hash against the chain before another attempt. Automatic cross-run reconciliation and an unattended live-submission scheduler are not shipped; the repository cron is decide-only. Do not use a lease timeout or a new journal path to bypass an uncertain attempt. See the engine setup guide.

Next Notifications Three events, one channel, and the channels that do not exist.